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Abstract— So-called non-local boxes, which have been intro-
duced as an idealization—in different respects—of the behavior
of entangled quantum states, have been known to allow for
unconditional bit commitment between the two involved parties.
We show that, actually, any possible non-local correlation which
produces random bits on both sides can be used to implement
bit commitment, and that this holds even when the parties are
allowed to delay their inputs to the box. Since a particular
example is the behavior of an EPR pair, this resource allows
for implementing unconditionally secure bit commitment as long
as the parties cannot entangle their Qbits with any other system.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PRELIMINARIES
A. Previous Work and Our Result
Since cryptographic functionalities often cannot be realized
in an unconditionally secure way from scratch, it is an inter-
esting problem to find simple and weak information-theoretic
primitives from which they can be realized. A particular class
of such underlying primitives are those which stem from
quantum physics. For instance, Bennett and Brassard have
shown that two parties can generate a common secret key
in an unconditionally secure way if they are connected by a
quantum channel [1].
Another central result in this context by Mayers [11] states
that it is impossible to realize bit commitment in an uncon-
ditionally secure way for both parties, even when they are
connected by a quantum channel. It is important to note that
the latter result even holds when the parties share a given pure
state, for instance an EPR pair,
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initially. Roughly speaking, an attacker can entangle his part of
the state. Actually, it is a consequence of our results that every
attack requires to use such entanglement: Bit commitment
from a shared EPR pair is possible as soon as the parties
cannot entangle their respective systems with any other system.
In order to get a better understanding of quantum-physical
phenomena such as entanglement or non-locality, the behavior
of quantum states has often been modeled as “boxes,” i.e.,
conditional probability distributions characterizing the joint
input-output behavior of the two- (or more) partite system.
A particular box that has been well-studied recently [3], [4],
[5], [6], [9], [13], [14], [10] is the so-called non-local box
[12], or NL box for short, the behavior of which does actually
not correspond to the behavior of any quantum state, but
is an idealization thereof. (The NL box is, however, also
“non-signaling,” i.e., its behavior does not allow for message
transmission). It has been shown in [15] that such an NL
box is essentially equivalent to oblivious transfer: A single
realization of one primitive perfectly allows for realizing the
other. Interestingly, this fact implies that oblivious transfer is,
as the NL box, symmetric, i.e., its direction can be perfectly
inverted for free.
Since oblivious transfer allows for bit commitment, this
result seems to contradict Mayers’ impossibility theorem. It
does not, however, since an NL box is not a quantum state,
and it is a natural question what the decisive difference is.
In [13], it has been suggested that it is the fact that in the
quantum setting, a party can delay her measurement. In [5]
it was shown, however, that NL boxes which do allow such
a delay as well can nevertheless be used to implement bit
commitment. Another potential reason is that the non-locality
of the NL box is “superstrong,” i.e., stronger than the one of
any quantum state. In this paper, we show that this is not the
case either: Even weak non-local behaviors do the job, for
instance the one arising from EPR pairs. We can, therefore,
conclude that the crucial point is that in the quantum setting,
a party can entangle her system with another, but not in the
case of a box. In other words, such states do actually allow for
bit commitment as long as the parties cannot entangle their
system with any other.
B. Definitions and Preliminaries
Definition 1: A bit commitment scheme is a pair of proto-
cols Commit and Open executed between two parties, A and
B. First, Commit is executed, where A has an input v and B
has no input. B can either accept or reject the execution of
Commit. Then, Open is executed, where B has an output v′.
B either accepts or rejects the execution of Open. The two
protocols must have the following properties:
• Correctness. If both parties are honest, then B should
always accept, with v′ = v.
• Privacy. If A is honest, then the execution of Commit
does not reveal any information about v to B.
• Binding. If B is honest and accepts after the execution
of Commit, then there exists only one value v′ (which is
equal to v if A is honest) that B accepts as output after
the execution of Open.
Definition 2: A non-signaling box (NS box for short) is a
box to which Alice can input a value X and Bob a value
Y . Alice then gets a value A ∈ {0, 1} and Bob gets a value
B ∈ {0, 1} such that Pr[A = a, B = b|X = x, Y = y] =
PAB|XY (a, b, x, y). (Here, we assume that a party receives its
output immediately after giving her input, independently of
whether the other has already given his input or not. Note
that the non-signaling condition implies that this is possible.)
Furthermore, the following conditions must hold:
• Non-signaling. For all values i, x, y ∈ {0, 1}, we have
Pr[A = i|X = x, Y = y] = 1/2,
Pr[B = i|X = x, Y = y] = 1/2.
• Dependence. PAB|XY 6= PA|XPB|Y .
Note that the non-signaling condition means that the output
of one player is independent of the input of the other, thus
the box does not allow for message transmission. If we had
PAB|XY = PA|XPB|Y , the box would just consist of two
local channels. This is excluded by the second condition, but
the dependence can be arbitrarily weak. In particular, it may be
some correlation that can be simulated using an EPR pair. The
above-mentioned NL box is a special case of a non-signaling
box, where we have PAB|XY (a, b, x, y) = 1/2 if a⊕ b = xy
and 0 otherwise.
We now introduce two technical lemmas used later.
Lemma 1 (Chernoff): Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent
random variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = p and Pr[Xi = 0] =
1− p. Let X =∑ni=1 Xi. For any t ≥ 0 we have
Pr[X ≥ E[X ] + t] ≤ e−2t2/n ,
Pr[X ≥ E[X ]− t] ≥ e−2t2/n .
Lemma 2: For any n we have
r∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2n/2+2r−2r2/n ≤ 2n/2+2r.
Proof: Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random
variables with Pr[Xi = 1] = 1/2 and Pr[Xi = 0] = 1/2.
Let X =
∑n
i=1 Xi. We have
Pr[X ≤ r] =
r∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
2−n .
Using the Chernoff inequality, setting r = n/2− t, we get
Pr[X ≤ r] ≤ e−2t2/n ≤ 2−n/2+2r−2r2/n ,
and therefore
r∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
≤ 2n2−n/2+2r−2r2/n ≤ 2n/2+2r .
II. BIT COMMITMENT FROM ANY NON-SIGNALING BOX
In this section, we show how to realize unconditionally
secure bit commitment from any NS box. Let n be the number
of calls to the NS box. Let s = n3/4 be a security parameter,
let k1 = n3/4, k2 = 8k1 + 2s, m = n/2 + 4k1 + s, and
d = 2k1+k2+1. Let, finally, l > 0 and k ≥ m+2s+l. Let C ⊂
{0, 1}n be a (n, k, d)-linear code, i.e., with 2k elements and
minimal distance d. Since we do not have to decode C, we can
use a random linear code. If k ≤ (1−H(d/n))n−s a random
code has a minimal distance of at least d with probability at
least 1−2−s. Since k = l+n/2+o(n) and d/n = o(1), we can
choose l = n/2− o(n). Let h : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m
and ext : {0, 1}∗ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}l be universial hash
functions. Let v ∈ {0, 1}l.
Protocol 1: Commit(v).
• Alice chooses x ∈R C, Bob chooses y ∈R {0, 1}n.
• Alice and Bob input x and y component-wise to the NS
box. Alice gets a ∈ {0, 1}n and Bob gets b ∈ {0, 1}n.
• Bob chooses r1 ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sends it to Alice.
• Alice sends Bob h(r1, a).
• Alice chooses r2 ∈R {0, 1}∗ and sends (r2, v ⊕
ext(r2, x)) to Bob.
Protocol 2: Open().
• Alice sends Bob x, a, and v.
• Bob checks whether x ∈ C holds, h(r1, a) is cor-
rect, whether the sequence (ai, bi, xi, yi) has the right
statistics, i.e., is distributed according to PABXY =
PXPY PAB|XY , and whether v ⊕ ext(r2, x) is correct.
If all these checks are ok, he accepts and outputs v.
Otherwise, he rejects.
In the following we will show that these two protocols
implement bit commitment, i.e., that it satisfies the three
conditions correctness, privacy, and binding.
Lemma 3: The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the
correctness condition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: Bob always accepts Commit. If Alice follows
the protocols, then h(x) and v⊕ext(r2, x) will be correct and
x ∈ C holds. Furthermore, with overwhelming probability, the
sequence (ai, bi, xi, yi) will have the right statistics. Therefore,
Bob accepts Open with overwhelming probability and outputs
v, the value Alice was commited to.
Bob cannot cheat actively since he does not send any
message. The following lemma proves that he does not get
any information if Alice is honest.
Lemma 4: The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the
privacy condition with an error of at most 2−s.
Proof: Let us assume that Alice is honest. We will show
that with probability at least 1 − 2−s, Bob does not get any
information about v before the opening. Since the box is non-
signaling, Bob’s values y and b are independent of x. Since
Alice chooses x uniformely, its min-entropy is equal to k.
The additional randomness r2 is independent of x, so all the
information Bob gets about x is h(r1, x), which has length
m. Therefore, Bob’s min-entropy about x is at least k − m.
It follows from the leftover hash lemma [8], [2], [7] that
extracting l = k − m − 2s bits makes the key uniform with
an error of at most 2−s. So Bob does not get any information
about v with probability at least 1− 2−s.
It remains to be shown that the protocols are binding.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that Alice will
finally give some input to all the boxes. Let her i-th input be
xi, and let her outcome be ai. Of course, she is not supposed
to send Bob the true values xi, ai, but she may change some
of them. However, if she changes more than k1 = n3/4 values
xi or ai, the sequence (ai, bi, xi, yi) will have the correct
statistics only with negligible probability. A malicious Alice
may also choose not to give input values to some of the boxes
until the opening phase. Let the number of these values be k2.
Lemma 5: If Alice does not input any values to at least k2
calls to the NS box, the probability that there exists a value
a′ that has a Hamming distance of at most k1 from her final
value a such that h(r1, a′) = h is at most 2−s+1.
Proof: Alice has to send a hash value h before the
opening phase. In the opening phase, she inputs the remaining
k2 values to the box and gets random outputs for them. So
she gets randomly one out of 2k2 possible values for a. She
can freely choose h, so she may also choose a value ah such
that h(r1, ah) = h. The probability that the Hamming distance
between ah and a is smaller than k1 is at most
k1∑
i=0
(
k2
i
)
2−k2 ≤ 2−k2+k2/2+4k1 = 2−k2/2+4k1 = 2−s.
For any value a′ 6= ah, the probability that h(r1, a′) = h is
equal to 2−m. So the probability that there is another value
a′ with Hamming distance of at most k1 near a, such that
h(r1, a
′) = h is at most
k1∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
2−m ≤ 2−m+n/2+4k1 = 2−s.
The statement follows. We have applied Lemma 2 twice.
In order to be able to open a commitment to two different
values v and v′, Alice needs to find two strings x and x′ which
are compatible with the commitment and such that her success
probability is maximized. We will now show that under certain
conditions, there never exist two values x and x′ such that Bob
would accept the opening for both.
Lemma 6: If Alice changes only k1 pairs and delays only
k2 inputs, then the protocol is binding as long as 2k1+k2 < d.
Proof: Any two valid inputs strings x and x′ have a
distance of at least d. If we ignore all the positions where
Alice did not input anything to the box, x and x′ still have a
distance of at least d − k2 values. Only one x′ ∈ C is closer
than (d− k2)/2 to the x that Alice has chosen.
We are now able to prove the binding condition.
Lemma 7: The protocols Commit and Open satisfy the
binding condition with an error negligible in n.
Proof: If Alice changes at least k1 = n3/4 values, she has
only exponentially small probability of success. Otherwise, if
she does not input anything to at least k2 calls to the box, she
has a probability of success of at most 2−s+1. But otherwise,
she will not be able to cheat, if 2k1 + k2 < d. Hence, her
overall success probability is negligible.
Theorem 1: There exists a reduction of bit commitment to
any NS box.
III. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that unconditionally secure bit commitment
between two parties can be obtained from any bi-partite
“input-output box” which produces random bits on both sides,
does not allow for signaling, and is not “separable” (i.e.,
consists of two independent channels on both sides). It is
important to note that, as in [5], this result even holds when
this box is such that each party can choose to delay certain
inputs (without the other party being aware of this: the box
will produce an output on the other side nevertheless). An
example of behavior such a box can have is the one of an
EPR pair under measurements. This result does not contradict
Mayers’ famous impossibility result since such boxes are
not quantum, and do not allow the parties to entangle their
parts of the system with another system, an operation—this
is a consequence of our results—necessary to carry out a
successful attack.
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